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AFTERMATH OF A DISASTER: PSYCHOLOGICAL
RESPONSE TO THE INDIANAPOLIS RAMADA JET CRASH
DESCRIPTION OF THE DISASTER EVENT
•

At approximately 9:20 A.M. on October 20, 1987 an Air Force jet fighter
crashed into the lobby of the Ramada Inn in Indianapolis.
completely unexpected and occurred without warning.

The event was

Although the hotel had

been fully occupied the previous night, most of the guests had already checked
out; the majority of those present were hotel employees.
immediate fatalities, all hotel employees.

There were nine

The remaining 22 employees were

safely evacuated immediately after the crash, except for one hospitalized with
burn injuries.

There was one non-employee fatality, a salesman who had

stopped to use a hotel phone, and who died of burn injuries approximately one
week after the crash.
This disaster was marked by a considerable degree of horror and terror.
Survivors told stories of looking out a picture window to see the plane flying
toward them; shrapnel from the plane blasting through walls five floors away;
trapped victims crying and screaming for help and beating on the walls as they
died; bodies charred beyond recognition and blown to pieces; and a man who
came running out of the hotel in flames. (See newspaper accounts in appendix.)
Upon emerging to safety outside the burning hotel, the immediate impulse
for many victims was to go back in to rescue those still trapped inside.
Several tried, but were immediately turned back by intense heat and smoke,
only to stand helplessly, listening with horror to their co-workers' screams
from inside as they perished •. The scene outside was chaos, with the first
arrivals of the 100 emergency and fire vehicles, swarms of newspaper and
television reporters, and crowds of onlookers and worried relatives.

These

crowds hampered frustrated victims in their frenzy to locate their loved ones.
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Red Cross rescue workers set up a waiting room for victims and their
families at a hotel a block away.
compiling a list of the missing.
as high as 50.

With the help of the victims, workers began
Early estimates of fatalities were reported

By 4 P.M., about 17 people were still unaccounted for.

Throughout the day, the employees waited together, hugging each other, and
sharing photos from their wallets and crying together.

The Ramada employees

described themselves as a close-knit group, like a family.
together for many years.

Some had worked

After the crash they pulled even closer together,

providing support for each other in a way that no one else could.

By 10 P.M.

all but a few of the victims' bodies had been identified, and the remaining
victims and families went home.

All had lost friends and co-workers; some had

lost close relatives.
There was a prompt response by the National Organization for Victims'
Assistance (NOVA), and group counseling was provided to all employees with1n a
few days of the crash.

As a result of the accident the hotel was closed for

what has proved to be an indefinite period; thus most employees suffered a
secondary loss of employment.

With the sudden lack of income, some were

unable to pay rent and were forced to move.

The Air Force remunerated victims

for losses of their possessions and, in some cases, for their loss of
income.

However, this assistance was reportedly irregular and indefinite.

temporary office was set up by Ramada Inn management and this enabled the
employees to maintain contact with each other.

However, this was made more

difficult due to uncertainty about the future of the hotel, many individuals
began to look for other jobs.
METHODS
We learned of the plane crash as we were preparing the quick response
grant application for study of the psychological impact of various types of

A
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disasters and included it in the proposal as one of the events to be
studied.

Prompt notification of funding allowed us to begin our research

efforts within ten days after the disaster.

The initial contact was with the

Disaster Services Office of the American Red Cross in Indianapolis.

This

yielded valuable information regarding the disaster as well as linking us with
the owner of the Ramada Inn.

A phone call to the owner indicating our

interest in studying the psychological effects of this event brought an
immediate response from his assistant.

Both he and the owner had been

scheduled to be in the hotel in the lobby area where most of the fatalities
occurred on the morning of the crash.

However, one forgot to set his alarm

and overslept; the other was delayed by another meeting.

There were in fact a

number of individuals who were supposed to be there that day but were not
because of a cancelled meeting, changing schedules, a doctor's appointment,
car trouble, etc.

Conversely, there were others who should not have been

there, like the local salesman who was killed.
Although we had originally planned to study individuals (employees and
guests) who were present at the time of the disaster, most of the hotel guests
had departed and hotel records of their registrations destroyed in the fire;
thus they could not be readily located.

Instead it was elected to interview

as many of the 61 surviving employees as possible.

Since the community of

hotel employees was so close-knit, it was expected that even those not present
at the time of the crash might have experienced psychological sequelae.

This

unusual arrangement of the occurrence of a severe disaster in a circumscribed
community of co-workers was ideal for an epidemiological study of this type.
It provided a rare opportunity to study an entire population of disaster
victims, systematically, in the acute phase following the event.

The

inclusion of off-site employees also allowed the unique opportunity to test

4

the hypothesis of'a dose-response relationship between

leve~

of exposure to

the disaster and degree of emotional upset.
Letters were sent to the 61 surviving hotel employees explaining the
study and inviting them to participate by responding via enclosed selfaddressed postcards or by telephone.

If no response was received, the

investigators followed up with a telephone call.
Sample
A total of 46 individuals were interviewed. Seventeen (37%) of these
"'~ere

on-site at the hotel at the time of the crash.

Of note, one non-

-'

, employee, a hotel guest, was included in the count of off-site individuals,
since he had been staying

~t

the hotel on business for several months, and was

generally considered by the employees to be a valued member of their
"communit y " of co-workers at the Ramada.

Seven subjects refused to be

interviewed (19% on-site and 9% off-site) for an overall refusal rate of
13%.

Nine individuals (14%) could not be located' due to complications of the

disaster (destroyed records; newly unemployed victims having to move for
financial reasons).
group.

Only one of the unlocated subjects was in the on-site

The total completion rate was 74%, fairly evenly divided between the

on-site (77%) and off-site (72%) groups.
Most persons interviewed agreed to participate because they wanted to be
of help in a research effort which they thought might benefit others in the
future.

Others felt a need to talk about their experience or saw it as an

opportunity to obtain help

personall~.

Among the on-site individuals who

refused, several indicated that they believed it would be too upsetting to
talk about the disaster experience and one had been advised by a lawyer to
sign nothing and talk to no one.

Other respondents reported that these on-

site refusers were among those they considered to be the most

upse~.

In

5

contrast, the refusals in the off-site group seemed to be primarly due to a
lack of involvement'or impact of the disaster.

Most of the unlocated

individuals were contract workers who had limited contact with the rest of the
close-knit community of employees.
Instruments
Subjects were interviewed about their psychiatric and social status using
a modified version of the Diagnostic Interview Schedule/Disaster Supplement
(DIS/OS) (Robins and Smith 1983).

This interview was desi9ned for the ECA

Hazards study funded by NIMH (Smith et al. 1986) and has been used by
investigators in several recent disaster studies.

It elicits information

about the disaster experience and the individuals' perceptions of the event,
use of formal and informal support systems, behavioral response to the
traumatic event, and 15 DSM-III diagnoses selected for their potential
relevance to the disaster experience.
diagnostic categories were included:

In this study only the following
post-traumatic stress disorder,

depression, somatization disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, panic
disorder, phobic disorders, antisocial personality disorder (adult component),
alcohol abuse/dependence, and drug abuse/dependence.
For each disorder that was ascertained to have occurred, age of onset and
age at last symptom were obtained, thus providing lifetime as well as current
psychiatric status.

Onset and recency for each positive symptom of the

relevant diagnoses were also obtained.

Thus information was available as to

the presence or absence of each symptom during the interval between the
disaster and the interview, and prior to the disaster.
The disaster interview also contained a number of other measures that
might be sensitive to changes in mental health.

These included use of health

services and psychoactive drugs, health and disability status, role function,
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and social support.

In addition to these questions, all of which were part of

the ECA interview, the disaster section explored the disaster experience and
its meaning for the respondents.

All participants were asked to evaluate news

coverage of the disaster, on whom they blamed the disaster, and whether other
stressful life events had occurred in the last year.
Subjects were also asked to complete two self-administered forms:

the

Impact. of Events Scale (Horowitz et al. 1979), a 1S-item questionnaire which
measures current subjective distress related to experiencing a stressful life
event; and the Tridimensional Personality Questionnaire (Cloninger 1986).
The majority of interviews were conducted in-person and were completed at
four to six weeks after the disaster event.

For various reasons, a few

interviews could not be scheduled in person and were completed by telephone.
Interviews were conducted by the authors, two fourth-year psychiatry
residents, and a research assistant.
participating.

All subjects were offered $10.00 for

The interview took on average approximately ninety minutes to

administer.
Data Analysis.

For the purposes of analysis, the subject group was

divided into three categories: IIhit" or on-site (N=17) , IInear-hitll (N=12),
and II miss ll (N=17). The IInear-hitll included those who had originally been
scheduled to be at work at the time of the crash, but for one reason or
another were not there

e.g., oversleeping, illness, cancelled meeting.

The

"miss" group consisted of those employees who were not on-site and who were
not scheduled to be working that day,-- e.g., nighttime bartender and
entertainment employees.
Because of the limited size of the stUdy sample, tests of significance
were not performed.

The results will be presented in a descriptive fashion.
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RESULTS .
Demographic Information.

The sample was two-thirds female and mostly

Caucasian, with a mean age of 29.2.
all sUbgroups (Table 1).

Sex ratios, race, and age were similar in

The sample contained a sizable number of part-time

and unskilled workers, which may help to explain the relatively young age of
the group.

Given this characteristic, rates of pre-existing psychopathology

might be lower than expected, since many subjects would not have yet reached
the age of risk for many psychiatric disorders.

On-site victims were more

often married than either of the off-site groups.

Most of the subjects had

completed high school or had obtained a G.E.D., and the "near-hit" group had
the highest frequency of individuals who had finished high school and attended
college.

This may reflect the fact that a meeting of the better-educated

management employees was cancelled at the last minute, and all these
individuals would have likely been killed in the meeting room which was
located near the point of the jet's impact.
SUbjective distress and attribution of blame.

Respondents were asked how

upset they had been after the plane crash, and how much they felt they had
been harmed.

Perceived degree of upset (Table 2J was scored high ("very

upset") by most respondents. It was not surprising that 100% of those on-site
reported that they were very upset.

The "mi ss II group contained the sma11 est

proportion of "very upset" subjects, reflecting a dose-related response
pattern.

Over seventy percent of those on-site and at least one half of the.

respondents in the two off-site groups believed that the disaster had caused a
great deal of harm.

Only one-fourth of sUbjects felt that they had completely

recovered, and the on-site victims were less likely than either of the offsite groups to report full or partial· recovery.
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Respondents were also asked if they thought the disaster was just an act
of God or nature, or whether they thought the victims or any other
individuals, industries, or government agencies were in any way to blame for
the degree of damage.

While 100% of on-site victims felt the disaster

reflected just an act of God or nature, many of the off-site subjects blamed
the victims.

About two-thirds at least partially blamed other individuals or

agencies with little variation across the subgroups.
Various respondents blamed the Air Force for not maintaining its jet
better; a few blamed the pilot for bringing a disabled jet into such a
populated area; many blamed the air traffic controllers for not communicating
properly with the pilot.

Rarely, airport personnel were blamed for not

calling the fire department to inform them that there had been no explosives
on the plane, which they believed would have allowed the rescue workers to
enter the burning hotel more quickly and save more lives.

Others blamed the

President and the Governor for not calling to express their sympathy, and for
~

not declaring the area a national disaster site.

For those who blamed their

fellow victims, the blame was often ascribed to those who died because they
had gone back inside the burning hotel to rescue their belongings rather than
escaping to safety when they might have.
able to rescue

others~

Some blamed themselves for not being

even when they recognized that the rescue was not

physically possible.
Psychiatric Impact.
As shown in Table 3, one-third of the sample developed a new diagnosis
[including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) by DSM-III criteria, alcohol
abuse/dependency, major depression, and generalized anxiety disorder]
following the disaster, i.e., incident cases.

These new disorders appeared in

a very apparent dose response fashion, with over half of the on-site subjects
developing a new disorder, diminishing to only 12% in the "miss" group •.
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Over half the sample met criteria for a psychiatric diagnosis
(prevalence) following the disaster, and unlike the incidence rates the
prevalence rate did not vary by degree of exposure.

Separating these two

rates of disease occurrence carves out those incident cases which were
specifically associated with the occurrence of the disaster.
Symptoms of PTSO were among the most common of symptoms experienced by
disaster survivors and these did not vary in frequency by sex distribution.
Three-quarters of the sample reported having at least one of the nine possible
OSM-III symptoms of PTSO, averaging 4.17 symptoms per subject (Table 4).
Number of subjects reporting symptoms varied in a dose-response fashion, with
100% of the on-site victims experiencing one or more PTSO symptoms.
group also had the highest mean number of symptoms per SUbject.

This

The "miss"

group, with the lowest number of symptoms per subject, still scored at least
one positive symptom in over half of subjects.

The symptom with the highest

frequency of endorsement was recurring dreams/intrusive recollections,
reported by almost three quarters of subjects and 94% of on-site victims.

In

the "miss" group, insomnia was the most common symptom, acknowledged by about
half •
Twenty-two percent of all victims met full OSM-III criteria for PTSO
after the disaster, with a mild dose-response relationship (Table 5).
Although the interview was not designed to make OSM-IIIR diagnoses, reported
symptoms were fit as closely as possible into OSM-IIIR criteria, and the data
were re-analyzed.

While it is recognized that this is not a perfectly matched

comparison due to the two different methodologies, it makes for at least a
rough comparison of OSM-III and OSM-IIIR criteria for PTSO in the same
population.

The overall prevalence of post-disaster PTSO rose from 22% to 33%

when OSM-IIIR criteria were used.

This is largely due to the fact that the
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DSM-IIIR criteria" do not require the presence of numbness and that the new
criteria do not include the presence of survivor gUilt.

Numbness and survivor

gUilt were the two DSM-III symptoms least frequently endorsed by the
subjects.

Most cases of post-disaster PTSD were cases that arose de novo,

i.e. without any prior history of the PTSD syndrome.

All cases of PTSD in on-

site victims appeared de novo following the disaster; this pattern was not
seen in the off-site subjects whose PTSD represented a recurrence of a
previous PTSD episode as frequently as it represented development of a de novo
disorder.
Of interest, none of the on-site victims recalled any prior history of a
PTSD episode, but 14% of the off-site group recalled a prior episode. This
suggests that the high frequency and severity of post-disaster PTSD syndromes
in the on-site victims may have blotted out their memories of prior episodes
of PTSD that the off-site victims were able to recall.

Alternatively, perhaps

the off-site victims may have volunteered past PTSD symptoms to compensate for
their lack of current PTSD symptoms.
Twenty percent of the respondents were abusing or dependent on alcohol
prior to the disaster (not shown), and about half this number of subjects was
actively abusing alcohol after the disaster (Table 6).

Those abusing alcohol

following the disaster were not necessarily the same ones having a history of
prior alcohol abuse.

The two subjects developing alcohol abuse for the first

time after the disaster were both in the on-site group.
alcohol abuse cases also met

criteri~

for dependence.

About half of the
Post-disaster alcohol

diagnoses did not vary in frequency between on-site and off-site groups.
Approximately one-fifth of the respondents met criteria for a previous
episode of depression (not shown), and on-site victims recalled somewhat less
in the way of past depressions than either the "near-hit" or "miss" groups.
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Depression was the most common post-disaster diagnosis, with over two-fifths
of sUbjects meeting criteria (Table 6).

Although not shown on the table,

males were slightly over-represented in depressive cases.

In the on-site

group, new or de novo depression occurred in one-fourth of the sample, and
this frequency decreased to half that amount in the "miss" group.
Impressively, 100% of all individuals with a prior depression had a recurrence
following the disaster in all subgroups (not shown).

Thus, pre-existing

depressive history appears to strongly predict relapse or persistence
following disaster in this sample.
On-site victims had twice the prevalence rate of post-disaster
generalized anxiety disorder as off-site victims with a rate of approximately
one in five for the entire sample (Table 6)..

Frequency did not vary by sex.

Anxiety disorders in on-site subjects appeared de novo following the disaster
about as often as they represented a recurrence.

There were no new-onset

anxiety disorders in the "miss" group.
There was considerable overlap in the
three most prevalent diagnoses:
disorder (Table 7).

post~disaster

occurrence of the

depression, PTSD, and generalized anxiety

Over half of the subjects met criteria for at least one

of these three diagnoses, and a third of the sample had two or more diagnoses.
Thirty percent of subjects met criteria for one of these three diagnoses, 35%
met criteria for two, and 7% met criteria for three (not shown). PTSD occurred
four times more frequently in conjunction with one of the other two diagnoses
than it did alone.

Generalized anxiety disorder occurred in conjunction with

another diagnosis eight times more frequently than it did alone.
. When the tabulation was expanded and repeated to include data on alcohol
disorders (the least frequent of diagnoses), it was found that those abusing
alcohol usually met criteria for at least one other non-alcohol diagnosis.
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Single-diagnosis cases of alcohol disorders, PTSO, and generalized anxiety
disorder did not add much to the overall prevalence rate of psychiatric
disorders.

The diagnosis of depression was the most likely of these four

disorders to occur in the absence of another.
Since the majority of the sample reported feeling somewhat upset or very
upset about the disaster, this variable did not provide a useful correlation
with more objective measures.

However, SUbjects gave more heterogenous

responses to questions about subjective perceptions of harm, and this
SUbjective measure was objectively supported by the finding of higher
frequencies of psychiatric diagnoses occurring in SUbjects expressing the
greatest perceived harm (Table 8).

A psychiatric diagnosis was present in all

subjects who reported that they' had not recovered.

Surprisingly, almost one-

fourth of those with at least one diagnosis felt fully recovered despite their
diagnosable psychopathology.

This unusual subset averaged 2.00 diagnoses per

subject; the most common diagnosis was depression in five of the six (not
shown).
Predictors of post-disaster psychiatric status.

Forty-three percent of

subjects gave a pre-disaster history of one of the following four psychiatric
diagnoses:

PTSD, major depression, alcohol abuse/dependence, and generalized

anxiety disorder (not shown).

The proportion having a pre-disaster

psychiatric diagnosis was highest in the "miss" group (47%) and lowest among
the on-site victims (35%).
In the Epidemiologic Catchment Area project, a survey accessing the
prevalence of mental disorders in the general population (Robins et al. 1984),
it was found that 29-38% of the sample had experienced at least one of the
fifteen OSM-III disorders.

These rates, which include other diagnoses besides

the four diagnoses examined in this analysis, are much smaller than the 43%
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pre-disaster prevalence rate in this population (Table 9).

Of interest, when

the analysis was expanded to include post-disaster disorders as well, the rate
rose to 54%.
Ten out of eleven sUbjects with a previous psychiatric diagnosis
experienced diagnosable post-disaster psychopathology, while less than half of
those without experienced post-disaster psychopathology.

Only two (9%) of

~he

22 subjects with a pre-disaster diagnosis were free of psychiatric disorder
following the disaster, and these two subjects were in the "miss" group.

Many

individuals without a prior diagnosis developed one after the disaster, but
more frequently they remained free of psychiatric disorder, and this held for
all SUbgroups •
. Other studies have shown that victims of disaster may have special
characteristics (e.g., low socioeconomic status) that predispose them to
experiencing a disaster, the same characteristics that predispose to
psychiatric disorders (Fergusson and Horwood 1987).

Unlike other studies of

low-income individuals who were at higher risk of experiencing a disaster
(e.g., due to living on a flood plain where land is cheaper, or residing in
trailers which are vulnerable to tornado damage) (Smith et al. 1986),
characteristics of the population in this study did not put them at risk for
experiencing this disaster.

The plane crash into the hotel lobby seemed to be

a more random event, and it was only by chance that the employees "got in the
way".
About one-fifth of the entire sample had previously received psychiatric
treatment, and one-third of these subjects had required hospitalization (Table
10).

History of psychiatric treatment was equally frequent among on-site and

off-site victims, with the highest frequency (29%) in the "miss" group and·
lowest (8%) the "near-hit" group.
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History of previous psychiatric treatment predicted development of one or
more post-disaster psychiatric diagnoses in 60% of victims. while 52% of
individuals without prior psychiatric treatment developed a post-disaster
diagnosis. suggesting that history of psychiatric consultation was not a
predictor of development of post-disaster psychopathology.

This may well be

due to the high frequency of psychiatric disorders.
About two-thirds of the entire sample took advantage of ,the group
counseling offered by NOVA after the disaster. with those on-site at the time
of the crash more often participating.

Most counseling participants felt that

it had been very helpful. and many stated that they would have liked more
sessions. especially individual sessions.

Most of those who wanted further

counseling said they didn't get it because they

coul~n't

afford it.

Seventeen

percent of the victims did seek professional help (psychiatrist or other
mental health professional) in the wake of the disaster (Table 10); however.
these individuals did not always represent the same individuals who had sought
psychiatric treatment in the past.

Treatment-seekers were fairly evenly

divided among those who sought treatment before the disaster. after the
disaster. and both before and after.
Coping.

Information on coping was obtained from subjects who reported

feeling upset after the disaster.

An overwhelming majority of survivors

reported that they depended on family or friends to help them cope with their
feelings.

But for most. this was not enough. and they turned elsewhere for

additional assistance.

About one-fourth turned to one of each of the

. following methods to cope:

medication. alcohol. or a health professional

(Table 11). Almost two-thirds coped by utilizing medication. alcohol. or the
services of a physician or counselor (not shown).

Of the 28% who admitted to

using alcohol to cope with their feelings about the disaster. two-thirds met
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lifetime criteria"for alcohol abuse, and half were actively abusing alcohol
after the disaster (not shown).

All but one of these alcohol abusers met

criteria for dependence, either currently or in the past; half were currently
dependent.

Females represented almost half of those using alcohol to cope,

but only one-third of all those abusing alcohol (not shown).
Respondents generally felt that what helped more than anything was the
support they received from family and friends.

Most felt that talking about

their experiences helped them resolve their feelings.

Many reported that

sharing their experiences and feelings with fellow co-workers who had been
through the same thing was invaluable, and that others who hadn't been there
couldn't understand or provide support in the way that their comrades could.
They often reported that their families and friends didn't want to listen to
them, and they welcomed the opportunity to talk to a listening ear as part of
participating in this research project.

A minority did not want to talk about

the disaster at all, stating they felt that they coped best by trying to
forget about it and getting on with their lives.
Several individuals coped by focusing their energies 6n helping to
support their fellow victims.

Many stories of altruism came to light in these

interviews, and some subjects reported that they drew strength from helping
others.

They developed telephone support networks among themselves, and

helped each other find jobs and housing.

Many reported that their experience

had strengthened or "proved" their religious faith.

Subjects commonly

reported that they had experienced a "sharp change in their values since the
disaster:

they appreciated each day in their lives in a way'that they hadn't

before; they placed more value on their families and less on material things.
For example, subjects said they now made a point of telling their spouses
frequently that they loved them, and they could not leave for work unless they
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had kissed all their children.

Many were making every effort to spend as much

time as possible with their famil ies and to "not take them for granted II
anymore.
CONCLUS IONS
The findings of our preliminary data analysis suggest that after a
disaster with strong elements of terror and horror, survivors experience high
rates of subjective upset correlated with objective evidence of psychopathology, often in a dose-response pattern.

One fourth of the victims had

developed a disorder that they had never experienced prior to the disaster;
this frequency was highest (over half) in the on-site group, and lowest in the
off-site group.

Clearly, propensity to develop a diagnosable psychiatric

condition was dose-related according to degree of direct exposure to the
disaster experience.

For PTSD and generalized anxiety disorder, degree of

psychiatric impact appeared to be dose-related to the victims' degree of
exposure to the disaster.

Other factors unrelated to exposure appeared to

playa more prominent role in the post-disaster experience of depression and
alcohol abuse/dependence.
The apparent dose-response relationship of PTSD and generalized anxiety
disorder would tend to support a hypothesis that the occurrence of these
disorders may be closely tied to the elements of terror and horror, which may
be important contributors to the severity of a traumatic disaster.

Depressive

disorders are perhaps more closely tied to other related factors such as
bereavement over loss of loved ones who died in the disaster, or gUilt over
having survived.
For depression, pre-existing cases predicted recurrence or persistence,
with all prior episodes recurring after the disaster.

Cases of PTSD tended to

arise de novo after the disaster without a pre-disaster history, especially in
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the high-exposure'group.

Even in those individuals who did not meet criteria

for any of the four major psychiatric disorders, evidence of stress was
apparent in their high frequencies of symptom reporting (e.g., a mean of four
PTSD symptoms per sUbject), and the symptoms appeared in a dose-response
relationship to level of exposure.
The apparent unmet needs of the disaster survivors in the sample were
expressed in their uniformly high rate of turning to external methods of
coping beyond what family and friends could provide -- i.e., the utilization
of medications, alcohol, or services of a health professional by 63%.

Half of

those using alcohol to cope met criteria for current alcohol abuse, and half
of these were physically dependent on it.

Respondents generally

fel~

that

disaster counseling was useful, and many felt in need of further help but
could not afford it.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The findings here are not an end-point; they represent a starting point
for future research.

Although the finding that post-disaster psychopathology

occurs in relatively high frequency and in a dose-response relationship is
important, further follow-up studies tracing the course of symptoms and the
process of recovery over time will be equally important.

And although the

discovery that perceived harm by the disaster and pre-existing psychopathology
are important predictors of post-disaster outcome in the acute phase is also
important, further follOW-Up studies showing predictors of long-term outcome
will be of considerable usefulness •.Workers who design future intervention
programs will need this information in order to tailor their programs to the
specific needs of those at highest risk.

Since 100% of pre-disaster

depression and almost half of pre-existing alcohol disorders tend to recur or
persist, perhaps disaster workers could target victims with such a history to
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focus their resources on those at highest risk.

In fact, almost two-thirds of

survivors who will have an acute post-disaster psychiatric disorder can be
predicted by identifying those who had a pre-disaster psychiatric history.

At

follow-up it will be possible to ascertain which forms of intervention have
been associated with the best outcomes.
Since systematic disaster research is still in the early stages, many
questions remain about the best way to go about designing research studies.
A crucial issue is that of timing of interviews.

Too much delay in getting

into the field initially may miss symptoms that occur in the early phases
following a disaster; also, victims may be less inclined to discuss their
experiences and feelings as time goes by.

It is not clear when is the best

time to return to the field for follow-up interviews, since few systematic
studies have utilized periodic reassessment.

Frequent re-interviews of the

same subjects would create additional problems in the methodology by
contaminating subjects' recollection of events and symptoms and reducing their
cooperation.
Ideally, a systematic, larger scale effort needs to be made which would
allow re-interview of portions of the sample at staggered intervals.

This

would establish optimum intervals for researchers to follow up their
subjects.. In the end, such improvements in research methodology will increase
understanding of the psychological consequences of a disaster and illustrate
the course of recovery.
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Table 1.

Sex
Male
Female

Demographics
Miss
(N=17)

All
(N=46)

5 (42%)
7 (58%)

7 (41%)
10 (59%)

17 (37%)
29 (63%)

16 (94%)
1 ( 6%)

10 (83%)
2 (17%)

16 (94%)
1 ( 6%)

42 (91%)
4 (9%)

5 (29%)
10 (59%)
2 (12%)
30.1

3 (25%)

8 (47%)

16 (35%)
23 (50%)
7 (15%)

13 (76%)

3 (25%)
3 (25%)

4 (24%)
3 (18%)

20 (43%)
6 (13%)"

6 (50%)

9 (53%)
1 (6%)

19 (41%)

9 (53%)

30 (65%)
10 (22%)

On-site
(N=17)

Near-hit
(N=12)

5 (29%)
12 (71%)

Race
White
Black
Age groups
<25
25-44
45-64
Mean age (years)

7 (58%)
2 (17%)
29.7

6 (35%)
3 (18%)
28.1

29.2

Marita 1 Status
Married
Divorced/
Separated
Single
Widowed

o

4 (24%)

o

o

1

(2%)

Education
HS grad or GED
Some college
Mean (Years)

11 (65%)
1 (6%)

11.6

10 (83%)
5 (42%)
12.8

4 (24%)
11.5

11.8

Table 2.

Perceived upset. harm. and degree of recovery

On-site
(N=l7)

Near-hit
(N=12)

Miss
(N=17)

All
(N=46)

17 (100%)
0
0
0

11 (92%)
0
0
1 (8%)

10
4
2
1

38
4
2
2

12 (71%)
5 (29%)

6 (50%)
6 (50%)

9 (53%)
8 (47%)

27 (59%)
19 (41%)

2 (12%)
8 (47%)
7 (41%)

3 (25%)
7 (58%)
2 (17%)

-7 (41%)

12 (26%)
24 (52%)
10 (22%)

Upset
Very
Somewhat
Not very
No info.

(59%)
(24%)
(12%)
(6%)

(83%)
(9%)
(4%)
(4%)

Harm
Great deal
Not much
Recovery
Full
Partial
None

9 (53%)
1 (6%)"

Table 3. Subjects with one or more psychiatric diagnoses *
after the disaster (prevalence versus incidence)
SUbjects with
one or mote
diagnosis

On-Site
(N"'l7)

Near hit
(N=12)

All cases after
disaster
(prevalence)

10 (59%)

7 (58%)

8 (47%)

25 (54%)

9 (53%)

4 (33%)

2 (12%)

15 (33%)

New cases
since disaster
(incidence)

Miss
(N=l7)

All
(N=46)

* Includes PTSO (by OSM-III criteria), alcohol abuse/dependence, depression,
and

gen~ralized

anxiety disorder.

Table 4.

PTSO Symptoms
Miss
(N=17)

All
(N=46)

On-site
(N=17)

Near-hit
(N=12)

dreams/
recollection

16 (94%)

9 (75%)

8 (47%)

33 (72%)

happening again

10 (59%)

4 (33%)

1 ( 6%)

15 (33%)

5 (29%)

3 (25%)

3 (18%)

11 (24%)

jumpy

14 (82%)

6 (50%)

3 (18%)

23 (50%)

insomnia

15 (88%)

6 (50%)

9 (53%)

30 (65%)

survivor guilt

7 (41%)

2 (17%)

4 (24%)

13 (28%)

concentration

10 (59%)

6 (50%)

6 (35%)

22 (48%)

avoid reminders

11 (65%)

4 (33%)

8 (47%)

23 (50%)

reminders make
worse

12 (71%)

7, (58%)

3 (18%)

22 (48%)

3.92

2.65

PTSO Symptom

numbness

mean number
of symptoms
sUbjects with
1 symptom

>

5.88
17 (100%)

10 (83%)

9 (53%)

4.17
35 (76%)

Table 5.

Post-disaster rates of PTSD diagnosis by DSM-IIIversus DSM-IIIR criteria

Rates of
PTSD Diagnosis

On-site
(N=I?)

Near-hit
(N=12)

Miss
(N=I?)

Ali
(N=46)

By DSM-III
criteria

5 (29%)

2 (17%)

3 (18%)

10 (22%)

By DSM-II IR
criteria

9 (53%)

3 (25%)

3 (18%)

15 (33%) .

· Table 6.

Rates of Psychiatric Diagnosis

All cases since disaster (Prevalence)
Diagnosis

On-site
(N=l7)

Near-hit
(N=12)

Miss
(N=I?)

All
(N=46)

PTSD*

5 (29%)

2 (17%)

3 (18%)

10 (22%)

Alcohol abuse/
dependence

2 (12%)

2 (17%)

2 (12%)

6 (13%)

Depression

7 (41%)

6 (50%)

6 (35%)

19 (41%)

Generalized
5 (29%)
anxiety disorder

2 (17%)

2 (12%)

9 (20%)

New Cases Since Disaster (Incidence)
On-site
(N=I?)

Near-hit
(N=12)

PTSD*

5 (29%)

1

Alcohol abuse/
dependence

2 (12%)

Depression

Miss
(N=I?)

All
(N=46)

1 (6%)

7 (15%)

0

0

2 (4%)

4 (24%)

3 (33%)

2 (12%)

9 (20%)

Generalized
3 (18%)
anxiety disorder

2 (17%)

0-

5 (11%)

(8%)

Diagnosis Present Before and After Disaster
(Persistence)
On-site
(N=17)

Near-hit
(N=12)

Miss
(N=1?)

All
(N=46)

PTSD*

0

1

(8%)

2 (12%)

3 (7%)

Alcohol abuse/
dependence

0

2 (17%)

2 (12%)

4 (9%)

Depression

3 (18%)

3 -(25%)

4 (24%)

10 (22%)

0

2 (12%)

4 (9%)

Generalized
2 (12%)
anxiety disorder

* Diagnosis made by DSM-III criteria.

Table 7. Overlap of Post-disaster Disorders (Prevalence)

"

//OEPRESSION
i

8

/
,/

GENERALIZED ANXIETY DISORDER
1
I

/

/

I

/

Subjects were counted as positive if they had either a new onset of
a recurrence of depression, PTSD, o~ generalized anxiety disorder.

* Diagnosis made with DSM-III criteria.

Table 8.

Relationship of number of post-disaster diagnoses *
to subjective reports of harm and recovery

Harm
No diagnosis
Not much
Great deal
Total

Z1 diagnosis *

(73%)

8

(26%)

4 (27%)

23

(74%)

11

31 (100%)

15 (100%)

Recovery
No diagnosis
Full
Partial
None
Total

~1

diagnosis *

5 (33%)

7 (23%)

10 (67%)

14 (45%)

0
15 (100%)

10 (32%)
31 (100%)

* includes PTSD (by DSM-III criteria), depression~ generalized anxiety
disorder, and alcohol abuse/dependence.

Table 9. Current psychiatric diagnoses * versus
prior psychiatric diagnoses

* includes PTSO (by OSM-III criteria), depression, generalized anxiety
disorder, and alcohol abuse/dependence.

Table 10. Treatment
Psychiatric
Treatment

On-site
(N=l7)

Near-hit
(N=12)

Miss
(N=l7)

All
(N=46)

Pre-disaster
treatment

4 (24%)

1 (8%)

5 (29%)

Pre-disaster
hospitalization

1 (6%)

a

2 (12%)

3

Current
treatment *

4 (24%)

a

4 (24%)

8 (17%)

* Refers to treatment by psychiatrist or other menta1 health

10 (22%)
(7%)

professional~

Table 11. Coping
Method of
Coping
Friends/Family

On-site
(N=16)

Near-hit
(N=10)

Miss
(N=14)

All
(N=40)

16 (100%)

10 (100%)

9 (64%)

35 (88%)

Medication

6 (38%)

2(20%)

3 (21%)

11 (28%)

Alcohol

6 (38%)

3 (30%)

2 (14%)

11 (28%)

Doctor*/Counselor

7 (44%)

2 (20%)

1 (7%)

10 (25%)

16 (100%)

2 (20%)

6 (43%)

24 (60%)

Other

* Doctor refers to medical doctor or other health professional or counselor.

